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I. INTRODUCTION
Prompted by an investigation opened by the National Highway Safety
Traffic Administration (NHSTA), Firestone initiated a massive recall of
approximately 6.5 million tires' on August 9, 2000.2 Prior to the recall,
NHSTA received "90 complaints, including reports of 33 crashes resulting
in 27 injuries and 4 deaths."3 NHSTA's investigation did more than prompt
Firestone's recall, however, it also sparked congressional hearings on the case
and the interest of the Justice Department, which is now looking into filing
criminal or civil charges. 4
One of the most enlightening moments during the two days of
congressional hearings came when Congresswoman Heather Wilson
questioned Gary Crigger, the executive Vice President for Business Planning
at Firestone. The exchange brought out the fact that although Firestone had
received hundreds of complaints from customers who claimed the tires had
I Nedra Pickler, U.S. Weighs Tire Death Charges Actions of Firestone, Ford Execs Examined, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 8, 2000, at 3.
2 Thee Ford Truck Factaes to Stay ClosedAnother Week, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, Sept. 9,2000,
at D15.
3 Id. The number of deaths linked to the problem with the tires has ranged from four to eighty-
eight in the United States and injuries from twenty-seven to 250. See id.; Pickier, supra note 1, at 3.
4 NPR: All Things Considered (National Public Radio, Inc. broadcast, Sept. 8, 2000), available at
2000 VIL 21471918.
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separated, Firestone used these complaints to prepare a cost-benefit analysis
in order to determine the best way to deal with its product liability rather
than establishing a plan to deal with the problem of consumer safety:'
Ford Motor Company, whose popular light trucks and sport utility
vehicles are equipped with Firestone tires, also came under fire with
NHSTA for its role in the consumer safety problems. Although Ford issued
a Firestone tire recall in sixteen foreign countries, beginning in August 1999
in the Middle East,6 "[n]o law required Ford to notify U.S. authorities, and
the company did not.""
This lack ofa notification requirement prompted the introduction of two
bills in the Senate. The first bill, introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy of
Vermont, would require U.S. tire and automakers to notify federal regulators
within two days of an overseas product recall.' The second bill, introduced
by Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, would establish Federal criminal
penalties of up to fifteen years in prison for defects that lead to death and five
years for injuries when corporate executives intentionally withhold
information on defective products.9 But are these measures going to be
enough? The problem with these bills and similar ones that are introduced
in a piecemeal fashion is that they are only band-aids to respond to a current
particularized problem. The difficulty in bringing a corporate criminal case
in general, as summarized by Joan Claybrook,'0 is the requirement that one
would have "to have knowing and willful reckless disregard and [the
authorities would] have to pinpoint the individual in the company who had
that knowledge.... ." Currently NHTSA is looking for evidence of that
knowledge in the Ford/Firestone case, but even if they find it, the maximum
fine is less than a million dollars. 2
Can a corporation really allow a defective product that is linked to
twenty-seven injuries and four deaths remain on the market and even if
discovered, only be slapped with a fine of less than a million dollars? The
problem stems from the inability of the U.S. justice system to deal with
corporate crime. The United States' solution to crime is imprisonment.
However, a corporation is a fictitious person, with no body to imprison.
Furthermore, performance-based pay schemes that provide incentives for
s See id.
6 See Three Ford Trucks Factories to Stay Closed Another Week, supra note 2.
7 Pickier, supra note 1.
8 See id.
9 Se id.
,0 Joan Claybrook is President of Public Citizen, a Washington, D.C. based lobbying group and
former head of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
it NPR: Al Things Considered, supra note 4.
12 Set id.
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executives to break laws, combined with the decentralized corporate
structure that makes it difficult to place the blame on any particular
individual, facilitate corporate crime.
13
One controversial alternative has been to hold corporate officers and
directors liable for the criminal acts of the corporation, based upon their
position in the company and their ability to prevent the violation of the law,
and not upon proof of intent to break the law. This is known as the
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine (RCO doctrine). Established by the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. Dotterweich,4 and reinforced
in United States v. Park," proponents of the RCO doctrine suggest that it is
a controversial alternative employed to "take a bite out of corporate crime. 
" 6
Discussing Park in general, one author suggests that:
Lawmakers have qualms about deviating from the traditional
standard of proving intent - and they should move slowly. The
Supreme Court decision undermined a fundamental protection
offered by the legal system [requiring that each criminal offense be
done with intent]. But the disturbing regularity with which
corporate leaders avoid responsibility suggests that it may be time to
consider novel solutions. 7
Although Crock admits that "nobody knows how much of a problem
corporate crime really is"'" he states that "Justice Department's Ogren
estimates that price-fixing, consumer and defense-procurement fraud, and
similar crimes may cost the public hundreds of billions of dollars." 9
Additional support for the RCO doctrine is suggested by a study by Marshall
B. Clinard, professor emeritus at the University ofWisconsin, claiming that
it is a misconception that top managers truly don't know when their
subordinates are violating the law.20 Clinard claims that in "a survey of
retired middle managers, 72% said that upper management knew about
improper conduct while it was going on or soon after."
21
1s See Stank Crock, How to Take a Bite Out of Corporate Crime, Bus. WK,July 15,1985, at 122.
14 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
is 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
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Part two of this note will discuss both the historical basis and the United
States Supreme Court's decisions establishing the RCO doctrine. This
section will also discuss the various policy reasons for the creation of the
doctrine. Part three of this note will discuss the application of the RCO
doctrine to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the various
decisions by the Circuit Courts of Appeals which split over whether the
doctrine can be applied to a statute which has a scienter element. Part four
of this note discusses the fiduciary obligations of a corporate officer or
director and how these obligations can in certain circumstances provide the
requisite scienter element for criminal prosecution. Part five then proposes
the expanded use of the RCO doctrine to other corporate crimes with a
scienter requirement where the policy reasons set out by the United States
Supreme Court are met.
H. RCO DOCTRINE
A. Background
Two state supreme court cases preceded the United States Supreme
Court decisions in Dottenveich and Park23 that marked the beginning of the
RCO doctrine. The first was a Colorado Supreme Court case, Overland
Cotton Mill Co. v. People.24 In that case, a superintendent of a cotton mill was
found guilty of hiring and employing a child under the age of fourteen in
violation of Colorado statutes. 2s On appeal from his conviction, the
defendant contended that the evidence was not sufficient to justify his
conviction.26 The court however, stated that "an agent of a corporation is
presumed to have the knowledge of its affairs particularly under his control
and management which, by exercise of due diligence, he would have
ascertained."' ! In this case, the defendant was the assistant superintendent,
he was engaged at the mill, and in the performance of his duties had
authority to hire and fire employees. 2 The court therefore found that
because of "his relationship to the company, and the performance of his
duties, he either knew, or, by the exercise of due diligence upon his part,
22 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
23 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
24 75 P. 924 (Colo. 1904).
2 See id. at 925 (providingthat any person who shall hire and employ a child under fourteen years
of age in any mill or factory shall be guilty of a misdemeanor).
26 See id. at 926.
27 Id.
28 See id.
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should have known, that a minor under the prohibited age was in the employ
of the company."" The court concluded "[flor this reason he must be held
as violating the statute, for it was within his power, by virtue of the
relationship he bore to the company to have prevented the employment. "3°
Another case that preceded the United States Supreme Court decisions
on the RCO doctrine is State v. Burnham.3' There, the Washington Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction of a secretary-treasurer-manager of a dairy
company for having in his possession, with intent to sell and deliver
substandard milkl 32 The court cited Overland Cotton Mill, approving the
proposition that "an agent of a corporation is presumed to have [the]
knowledge of its affairs particularly under his control and management
which, by the exercise of due diligence, he would have ascertained."
33
However, the Washington Supreme Court went one step further, adding:
We think the rule applied to the principal in the cases cited from this
court should be extended to a managing agent when the offense consists
in the violation of a police regulation when neither a guilty knowledge nor a
criminal intent is made an element of the offense.'
B. United States Supreme Court Decisions
United States v. Dotterweih35 is generally cited as the birth of the RCO
doctrine. Dotterweich involved a president of a corporation who was held
liable for adulterated or misbranded food under the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act. Simultaneously, the company in which Dotterweich was the
President was found not guilty.36 The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act prohibited "the introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate
commerce of any ... drug.., that is adulterated or misbranded."3 7 Further
the act provided that "any person" violating this provision is... made guilty
of a misdemeanor. "3 On appeal, Dotterweich claimed that since the
company had already been charged, in essence, he could not also be
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 128 P. 218 (Wash. 1912).
32 Seeid. at 219.
Id.
3 Id. (emphasis added).
33 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
3 See id. at 278.
37 21 U.S.C. §331 (1938), amended by 21 U.S.C. S331 (1997).
3 21 U.S.C. S333 (1997).
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charged.39 In other words, the specific issue before the court was, did the
term "person" within the statute limit liability to one or the other? The
United States Supreme Court held that "[t] he offense is committed, unless
the enterprise which they [RCO] are serving enjoys the immunity of a
guaranty, by all who do have such a responsible share in the furtherance of
the transaction which the statute outlaws ... ."40 Therefore, by holding that
a responsible corporate officer shared the liability with the corporation, the
RCO doctrine was born. This is significant because earlier cases involving
the prosecution of corporate officers had not primarily relied on sharing
liability but rather the proposition that a corporate officer may be held liable
in addition to the corporation's liability, i.e., if he could be proven
independently liable.41 The RCO doctrine alleviated the need to prove
independent liability of a corporate officer. Instead, a corporate officer could
now share liability based upon his position in the corporation, and his ability
to prevent violations of the law. The United States Supreme Court, in
Dotterweich, declined to indicate what class of employees would stand in
responsible relation or who had a responsible share, 2 leaving it to the "good
sense of prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate
judgment ofjuries."43 This has been a rather unhelpful test, leading many to
speculate that occupying the position of president of a corporation would
lead to convictions under the RCO doctrine." As examined herein, many
courts have reached differing conclusions as to who exactly is a responsible
corporate officer.
The Supreme Court's justification for holding a responsible corporate
officer liable for the crime of the corporation was that "in the interest of the
larger good, it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise
innocent, but standing in responsible relation to a public danger."4"
Balancing the relative hardships, the Court continued, "Congress has
preferred to place it upon those who have at least the opportunity of
informing themselves of the existence of conditions imposed for the
protection of consumers before sharing in illicit commerce, rather than to
throw the hazard on the innocent public who are wholly helpless."' The
See Dotetweich, 320 U.S. at 281.
40 Id. at 284.
41 See supra Part IIA
42 See Dot etweich, 320 U.S. at 285.
43 Id.
" See infra Part III.
45 Dotterudh, 320 U.S. at 281.
46 Id. at 285.
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Supreme Court's justification follows the rationale of the director's duty of
care in that directors have a duty to inform themselves.
47
United States v. Park" decided by the Supreme Court nearly thirty years
after Dotterweich, reaffirmed the Court's decision to apply a strict liability
standard to a responsible corporate officer in the context of the Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act. 9 Since the statute required no mens rea, the RCO
sharing the corporation's liability required no mens rea either. The Court
quoted Dotterweich saying "[t] he [Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic] Act is
of a now familiar type which dispenses with the conventional requirement
for criminal conduct, awareness of some wrongdoing."s' The Court opined
that "the Act imposes not only a positive duty to seek out and remedy
violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement
measures that will insure that violations will not occur.""' The Court went
on to state, "the requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on
responsible corporate agents are beyond question demanding, and perhaps
onerous, but they are no more stringent than the public has a right to expect
of those who voluntarily assume positions of authority in business
enterprises .... 5,,2 Again, the courts reasoning implicates the duty of care that
corporate officers owe to their corporations.13  "Central to the Court's
conclusion that individuals other than proprietors are subject to the criminal
provisions of the Act was the reality that 'the only way in which a corporation
can act is through the individuals who act on its behalf'"' Here again, the
court examined the question of who would be responsible s" citing the court
in Dotterweich, "[t]he test of responsibility, therefore, depended on the
evidence produced at the trial and its submission - assuming the evidence
warrants it - to the jury under appropriate guidance." s6
4 See infra Part IVA
48 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
49 See id. at 676 (concluding "[w]e are satisfied that the Act imposes the highest standard of care
and permits conviction of responsible corporate officials who, in light of this standard of care, have the
power to prevent or correct violations of its provisions.").
so Id. at 668 (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)).
s1 Id. at 672.
52 Id.
s3 See infra Part 1ILA, discussing the corporate officer and director's duty of care requiring
implementation of adequate oversight procedures.
s4 Park, 421 U.S. at 668 (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)).
55 The Court surveyed cases decided after Doltnueich to decide who bore a responsible relation
to the criminal violation. The Court stated "the Courts ofAppeals have recognized that these corporate
agents vested with the responsibility and power commensurate with that responaibility, to devise whatever
measures are necessary to ensure compliance with the Act bear a 'responsible relationship' to, or have a
'responsible share' in violations." Park, 421 U.S. at 672.
56 Id. at 669 (quoting United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)).
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In Park, the Court drew a roadmap, showing how the concept of holding
corporate officers criminally liable, when they had a responsible share in the
furtherance of the transaction the statute outlawed, was not "formulated in
a vacuum." s7 The Court stated that under the previous 1906 Act, knowledge
or intent were not required to be proved in prosecutions under its criminal
provisions.58 The generally accepted principal, where a corporate officer
caused the corporation to commit a crime, he himself was not immune from
liability, added strength to the argument.s9 Further, the Court reasoned, the
causes were not limited to a positive act, but also included default or
omission.60 "In cases decided after Dotterweich, the Courts of Appeals have
recognized that those corporate agents vested with the responsibility, and
power commensurate with that responsibility, to devise whatever measures
are necessary to ensure compliance with the Act bear a 'responsible
relationship' to, or have a 'responsible share' in, violations. " 61 It is important
to note that both Dotterweich and Park dealt with violations of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Therefore, since there is no mens rea
requirement, this was a strict liability crime.6
The Supreme Court implied an expanded use of the RCO doctrine in
United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp.63 Decided in 1971,
prior to Park, the Supreme Court determined the word "knowingly" applied
only to knowledge of the facts, not knowledge of the regulation or a violation
of the regulation.' The defendant was charged with shipping sulfuric and
hydrofluosilicic acids in interstate commerce and "knowingly fail[ing]" to
indicate on the papers that they were corrosive liquids in violation of
7 Id. at 670.
58 See id.
S See id. at 671.
60 See id. The court stated:
The principal has been applied whether or not the crime required consciousness of
wrongdoing and it had been applied not only to those corporate agents who themselves
committed the criminal act, but also to those who by virtue of their managerial positions or
other similar relation to the actor could be deemed responsible for it's commission.
Id. (citations omitted).
61 Id. at 672.
62 In Dottuerelh, the court stated that "such legislation [referring to the Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act] dispenses with the conventional requirement for criminal conduct - awareness of some
wrongdoing." 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943); see also BLACK(S LAW DICTIONARY 378 (7th ed. 1999) (defining
a strict liability crime as "a crime that does not require a mens tea element. ..
6 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
" In International Minerals, the court stated "we decline to attribute to Congress the inaccurate
view that the Act requires proof of knowledge of the law, as well as the facts, and that it intended to
endorse that interpretation by retaining the word 'knowingly'." Id. at 653.
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regulations. 65  The Court opined that where dangerous products are
involved, "the probability of regulation is so great, that anyone who is aware
that he is in possession of them or dealing with them must be presumed to
be aware of the regulation."justice Stewart disagreed with the majority. In
his dissent, he stated that the majority's holding meant that a person who had
never heard of the regulation might make a single shipment in his lifetime
and be guilty of a criminal offense punishable by a year in prison.6 The
majority answered Justice Stewart's concern with a well-settled legal
principal of criminal law, "ignorance of the law is no excuse. "6
III. CIRcurr COURTS SPLIT OVER SCIENTER REQUIREMENT
IN RCRAACT
There seems to be much confusion and debate between the circuits on
whether or not the RCO doctrine might apply to other public welfare
statutes that have a scienter element. The favored vehicle in this expansion
is the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).69 Since the RCRA
is at least arguably ambiguous about which elements the "knowing"
requirement applies to, 0 the circuits have split in determining whether there
65 See id. at 558.
66 Id. at 565.
67 See id. at 569 (StewartJ., dissenting). Justice Stewart pointed out that:
The only real impact of this decision will be upon the casual shipper, who might be any man,
woman, or child in the Nation. A person who had never heard of the regulation might make
a single shipment of an article covered by it in the course of a lifetime. It would be wholly
natural for him to assume that he could deliver the article to the common carrier and depend
upon the carrier to see that it was properly labeled and that the shipping papers were in order.
Yet today's decision holds that a person who does just that is guilty of a criminal offense
punishable by a year in prison.
Id.
's Id. at 565. The court opined that it would be a different story if the statute had provided that
"whoever knowingly violated a regulation of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be guilty of an
offense." Id. In that case, a person would have to know the regulation existed in order to knowingly violate
that regulation.
69 The expansion of the RCO Doctrine into the RCRA has generated much controversy. See M.
Diane Barber, Fair Wanting: 7he Deterioration of Scienter Under Environmental Criminal Statutes, 26 LOY. LA
L REv. 105, 147-48 (1992) (arguing against lowering mens rea requirements for environmental crimes);
Kevin L. Colbert, Consideration of the Scienter Requirement and the Responsible Corporate Offier Doctrine for
Knowing V'olations of Environmental Statutes, 33 S. TEX LJ. 699,701-02 (1992). But see Barry M. Hartman
& Charles DeManaco, The Present Use of the Responsible Corporate Ofer Doctrine in the Criminal Enforcement
of Environmental Laws, 23 ENVTL L REP. (ENVrL L. INST.) 10151 (Mar. 1993) (stating that the RCO
doctrine does not eliminate the applicable statutory requirements for knowledge in criminal litigation).
70 Resource Conservation and RecoveryAct of 1976,18 U.S.C. S 2 (1976), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
S 6928(d) (1999).
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must be actual knowledge or whether knowledge can be inferred by
circumstances. The ambiguity in the statute exists because the term
knowingly could apply to any one of the following six elements: (1)
Defendant transported waste to a facility, (2) the waste was hazardous waste,
(3) the facility did not have a permit, (4) that the facility is required to have
a permit, (5) that regulations require a permit, or (6) that transporting to a
facility without a permit is unauthorized or illegal.7 '
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.Johnson & Towers,
Inc.72 held the RCRA required knowledge of both the regulation and the
violation, 3 therefore the defendants must have knowingly violated all six of
the above elements. The defendants in this case were charged with pumping
hazardous wastes into a trench without a permit.74 The company plead guilty
to the RCRA counts, but the individual employees, a foreman and a service
manager, pled not guilty. 7- Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
added knowledge of the regulation, it did not really change the definition of
knowing from that of the Supreme Court in International Minerals.76 The
court stated that "our conclusion that 'knowingly' applies to all elements of
the offense in section 6298(d)(2)(A) does not impose on the government as
difficult burden as it fears."" The Third Circuit Court ofAppeals stated that
owners or operators of the facility could be held responsible if they knew or
should have known that their company had not complied with the RCRA's
permit requirements..7 The court went on to conclude that such knowledge,
[a]ny person who
(2) Knowingly treats, stores, or disposes of any hazardous waste identified or
listed under this subchapter - -
(A) without a permit under this subchapter or pursuant to title I of the
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Art... or
(B) in knowing violation of any material condition or requirement of such
permit.
Id.
I7 The division of knowing into six elements is suggested by Rebecca S. Webber, ElementAnalysis
Applied to Environmental Crimes; What Did They Know and Whn Did They Know It?, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 53, 84 (1988).
72 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984).
73 See id. at 668 (concluding that "either that the omission of the word 'knowing' in (A) was
inadvertent or that 'knowingly' which introduces subsection (2) applies to subsection (A).").
74 See id. at 664.
7s See id.
76 See id. at 669. The court indicated that they were guided by the Supreme Court's holding in
International Minerals. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 63 to 68.
7 Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 669.
78 The court stated that although S 6925 of the RCRA requires owners and operators to secure
a permit, "Congress did not explicitly limit criminal liability for impermissible treatment, storage, or
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"including knowledge of the permit requirement may be inferred by thejury
as to those individuals who hold the requisite responsible positions with the
corporate defendant." 9
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Hayes
International Corp.,s° held a conviction under RCRA's permit provision"'
required only that the defendant knew there was no permit for the disposal
site, and that the waste disposed of was a mixture of paint and a solvent.82 In
other words, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals specifically limited the
knowing requirement to the facts, not the law. Therefore the defendant's
claim that he did not know that paint waste was hazardous waste within the
meaning of the regulations and that he did not know a permit was required
amounted to no more than a mistake of law and once again defeated the
claim on the principal that ignorance of the law is no excuse. 
3
Three years later, in United States v. Hoflin,s4 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals also disagreed with the court in Johnson & Towers and went even
farther than the court in Hayes International, holding that knowledge that a
disposal permit had not been obtained was not required for a conviction for
improper disposal under RCRA. s The court based its reasoning in part on
congressional intent, stating:
Had Congress intended knowledge of the lack of a permit to be an
element under subsection (A) it easily could have said so. It
specifically inserted a knowledge element in subsection (B), and it
did so notwithstanding the 'knowingly' modifier which introduces
subsection (2). In the face of such obvious congressional action we
will not write something into the statute which Congress so plainly
left out. 6
disposal to owners and operators." Id. at 667. Therefore, even though it was not their responsibility to
acquire the permit, the defendants only had to know that one was required. See id.
79 Id. at 670.
so 786 F.2d 1499 (11 th Cir. 1986).
81 42 U.S.C. S 6928(d)(1) (1983). The statute provides criminal sanctions for any person who
(1) knowingly transports any hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter to a facility which
does not have a permit under S 6925 of this title. As amended, 42 U.S.C. S 6928(d)(1) (1985), makes the
statute applicable to anyone who "transports or causes to be transported".
82 Hayes International, 786 F.2d at 1505.
9 See id.
S 880 F.2d 1033 (1 1th Cir. 1989).
as See id. at 1039.
86 Id. at 1038.
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The court also specifically approved International Minerals' presumption that
anyone dealing in hazardous materials has knowledge of the regulations
governing them.'
In United States v. Dee, 88 and in United States v. Baytank (Houston), Inc.89
the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals respectively followed Hayes
International and Hoflin's lead by requiring only that the defendant's knew
what they were doing and not what the law required.90
While most of the circuits seemed to be following the United States
Supreme Court's lead in International Minerals, the First Circuit Court of
Appeals, deciding United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.9 in
1991, refused to apply the responsible corporate officer doctrine to the
RCRA.92 The court stated that:
Simply because a responsible corporate officer believed that on a
prior occasion illegal transportation occurred, he did not necessarily
possess knowledge of the illegal shipment he was charged with. In
a crime having knowledge as an express element, a mere showing of
official responsibility under Dotterweich and Park is not an adequate
substitute for direct or circumstantial proof of knowledge.93
Therefore, until the Supreme Court decides to hear a case deciding the
limitations on use of the RCO doctrine in the context of the Resource
Conservation Recovery Act, the lower federal courts have been left up their
own interpretations."
97 See id.
Be 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990).
89 934 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1991).
g0 SeeDee, 912 F.2d at 745 (holding that the government did not need to prove defendant's knew
a violation of the RCRA was a crime but that the defendant's had to know of the general hazardous
character of the waste); Bagank, 934 F.2d at 613 (holding that 'knowingly' means no more than the
defendant knows factually what he is doing, it is not required that he know that there is a regulation).
91 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991).
92 See id. at 55. The court generally agreed that:
Knowledge could be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including position and
responsibility of defendants such as corporate officers ..... However... proof that a
defendant was a responsible corporate officer... would [not] suffice to conclusively establish
the element of knowledge expressly required under [5 6928(d)(1)] ....
Id.
9 Id.
9 See United States v.Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984) cern. denied, 469 U.S.
1208 (1985); United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1989) cer. denied, 493 U.S. 1083 (1990);
United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 499 U.S. 919 (1991).
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As we have seen, courts have been willing to find the requisite statutory
mens rea in a variety of circumstances in order to hold a responsible
corporate officer liable. They have allowed knowledge to be inferred from
the circumstances without proof of actual knowledge. If circumstantial
evidence might be used, what about imputing knowledge to a responsible
corporate officer because he has a duty to know?
IV. DIRECTOR'S DUTY OF CARE
A. Director's Fiduciary Duties
A director's fiduciary duties are generally made up ofthe duty of care and
the duty of loyalty. While the duty of loyalty generally involves faithfulness
to and non-competition with the director's company, the duty of care
implicates the way corporate officers engage in company business. 95
The duty of care requires directors and officers to maintain adequate
oversight of corporate operations and to obtain adequate and reliable
information before making decisions. The duty of oversight requires a
director or officer to take an active role in monitoring the corporation's
activities. % Additionally, in the case of In re Caremark International, Inc.
Derivative Litigation,97 the court concluded that in light of the adoption of
federal sentencing guidelines in 1991, for crimes committed by corporations,
a director's duty of care requires them to establish such oversight procedures
and reporting systems. 9 The Revised Model Business Corporation Act takes a
similar stance stating:
The members of the board of directors or a committee of the board,
when becoming informed in connection with their decision-making
function or devoting attention to their oversight function, shall
discharge their duties with the care that a person in a like position would
reasonably believe appropriate under similar circumstances."
9s See REV. MODEL BUS. CoRP. AcTS8.30 OFFICIALCMT. (1983) (setting forth the standards of
conduct for directors by focusing on the manner in which directors perform their duties).
96 See infra Francis v. United Jersey Bank 432 A2d 814 (1981), notes 119 to 122 and
accompanying text, where the court lists several steps that a reasonably prudent director should take in
order to maintain proper oversight over a corporation's affairs.
9 698 A2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
98 See id. at 970.
99 REV. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT S 8.30(b) (1983) (emphasis added); see also REV. MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT S 8.42 (1983) (setting out similar duties for corporate officers).
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Additionally, the American Law Institute in its Principles of Corporate
Governance dictate that a director or officer has a duty to the corporation to
perform the director's or officer's functions in good faith, in a manner that
he or she reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation,
and with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be
expected to exercise in a like position and under similar circumstances. 1'0
Generally the purpose of these sections, which are common in every type of
jurisdiction, is to require officers and directors ofa corporation to adequately
inform themselves before making decisions and to require the officer or
director to fulfill a duty of oversight in the corporation. In other words, the
director or officer has a duty to the corporation not only to make decisions
that will not get it into trouble, but also to make sure that no one else in the
corporation allows it to get into trouble. Once it is established that the
director/officer owes this duty to the corporation, that is, once it has been
established that directors and officers owe a duty of care to the corporation,
the next step is to show that corporations have a duty not to violate the law.
It is well settled law in almost every jurisdiction that a "corporation can
break the law.'0 ' It is also well known that corporations cannot act except by
or through their agents.'O This is the point where the RCO doctrine and the
director's duty of care differ. Under the RCO doctrine, it is the government
that prosecutes violations of the law. On the other hand, violation of the
duty of care is generally actionable in a shareholder's derivative suit, a civil
action. This comment does not argue that shareholders should be able to
press criminal charges against directors for breach of the duty of care. And
this comment does not argue that criminal prosecution is the appropriate
remedy for all breaches by corporate officers of their duty of care. It is only
at the point where a corporate officer or director's violation of the duty of
care results in the corporations being accused of breaking the law that
criminal prosecution of that corporate officer is appropriate."ts If it is
10D See AMERICAN LAW INsTfITUTE, PRINCIPALS OF CORP. GOVERNANCE; ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS S 4.01 (1994).
,01 See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 281 (1943) (where Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act specifically defines person to include corporations); see aLso State v. Kailua Auto Wreckers,
Inc., 615 P.2d 730,736 (Haw. 1980) (holdinga corporation liable under State Public Health Regulations);
see generally Crock, supra note 3.
10 See Dotteru, ech, 320 U.S. at 281, citing New York Central & H.R.R. Co. v. United States, 212
U.S. 481 (1909) (stating "the only way in which a corporation can act is through the individuals who act
on its behalf").
103 See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 826 (N.J. 1981) (stating that negligence [in
duty of care] of Mrs. Prichard [Defendant] does not result in liability unless it is a proximate cause of the
loss.).
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appropriate to punish a corporate officer if it can be shown that he actively
participated in or directed the conduct,"° then it follows that the officer who
failed in his duty to keep his corporation from breaking the law, even if he
was not the person who actually did the deed, should also be liable. The
criminal law has generally borrowed from the law of agency l s and tort
law"° in this area requiring an act or direction by the responsible corporate
officer. Generally, the participation principal of tort law holds that knowl-
edge of tortuous conduct is not enough. Indeed it is not even enough to
show that an omission caused the tortuous act, there must be action by the
responsible officer. This gives rise to the distinction between commission of
a crime and omission.1°7 In criminal law, a violation of the law generally
requires an act, (actus reas) and an intent to commit the crime (mens rea),
except in the area of strict liability.'tO Interestingly, however, in criminal law
where there is a duty to act, and one fails to do so, the omission is also a
crime'0 In the corporate structure, as we have seen, the corporate direc-
tor/officer has a duty of oversight." It follows then that the omission or
failure to comply with this duty of oversight must also lead to criminal
liability. This, therefore, is one distinction that the RCO doctrine makes
from generally accepted corporate criminal liability. The general dispute that
most commentators have is not whether the corporate officer actually
committed the act, but whether the officer/director had the mens rea to
104 See In re Matter of Dougherty, 482 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) ("A corporate
officer may be held liable for hazardous waste violations if the officer personally participates in the
wrongful, injury producing act.... However, the evidence must show that the individual either directs
or participates in the violations.").
105 See generally TIMOTHY P. BJUR AND JEFFREY REINHOLTZ, 3A FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA
CORPORATIONS S 1135 (1990) (stating that "corporate officers, charged in law with the affirmative official
responsibility in the management and control of the corporate business, cannot avoid personal liability
for wrongs committed by claiming that they did not authorize and direct that which was done in the
regular course of that business, with their knowledge and with their consent or approval .... ."); see also
2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY SS 343-44 (1958) (stating that an act or omission by corporate
officer logically leads to inference he participated in act).
106 See Mozingo v. CorrectMfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168,173 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that "Mississippi
follows the general rule thatwhen a corporate officerdirectly participates in or authorizes the commission
of a tort, even on behalf of the corporation, he may be held liable.").
107 SeegeneraUyJOSHuA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW S9.07(1995) (stating that
a defendant's omission of a common law duty to act, assuming that she was able to perform the act, will
serve as a substitute for a voluntary act).
1 See id. (stating that except in rare circumstances, a person is not guilty of an offense unless he
performs a voluntary act [or omits an act that is his legal duty to perform] that causes social harm [the
actus reus], with a mens rea [literally, a "guilty mind"] unless it is a strict liability offense).
109 See id.
ll0 See supra notes 95-100.
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commit that particular crime."' Generally the law agreed with these
commentators. But, where public welfare statutes have been involved, the
courts many times have been less strict about the applicable mens rea
requirement. In these contexts, the courts have generally been saying that we
can hold some corporate officers or directors liable, either with or without the
corporation, as long as they stood in a responsible relation to the violation
and they failed to prevent the violation.'
An example of a civil case where a corporate director was held personally
liable for failure in her duty of care is Francis v. United Jersey Bank.' 3 The
facts of this case are particularly egregious and may well have led to criminal
charges against the corporation. Mrs. Pritchard was a director and the largest
single shareholder of Prichard & Baird, a reinsurance broker." 4 After Mrs.
Pritchard's husband died, and she inherited his shares, and her sons, also
directors in the company, began to siphon off funds from the corporation
under the guise of loans."s The "loans" far exceeded their salaries and
financial resources. 1 6 Consequently, the firm filed for bankruptcy. Mrs.
Pritchard, on the other hand, was not active in the business and knew
virtually nothing of its corporate affairs. She briefly visited the corporate
offices on one occasion and never read nor obtained any annual financial
statement. She was unfamiliar with even the rudiments of reinsurance and
made no effort to familiarize herself with the policies and practices of the
corporation. Additionally, she did not ensure that the policies and practices
of the firm pertaining to the withdrawal of funds, complied with industry
custom or relevant law.' 7 The relevant statutory provision dealing with the
director's duty of care, provided that it was incumbent upon the directors to
"discharge their duties in good faith and with that degree of diligence, care
and skill which ordinarily prudent men would exercise under similar
circumstances in like positions.""" The court opined several rules that a
It See Cynthia H. Finn, The Responsible Corporate Officer, Criminal Liability, and Mens Rea:
Limitations on the RCO Doctrine, 46 AM. U.L REV. 543, 556-562 (1996) (arguing that expansion of the
RCO doctrine is unjustified in light of the Supreme Court's recent strengthening of the statutory mens
rea requirements); Stefan A. Noe, 'Wllful Blindness": A Better Doctrine For Holding Corporate Oicers
Criminally Respnsiblefor RCRA Violations, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1461 (1993).
112 See supra Part 11A
11 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981) (holding that defendant was personally liable as a corporate officer
where she had the power to prevent losses due to other insider's actions and failed to do so).
114 See id. at 816.
11s See id. at 818.
16 See id. at 819.
117 See id.
its Id. at 820 (construing New Jersey Business Corporations At, N.J. STAT. ANN. S14A- 6-14
(Supp. 1981-82)).
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director should follow in exercising her duty of care. First, the director
should obtain a basic understanding of the corporation's business activities
and should decline to serve if she is unable to comprehend the fundamental
aspects of its operations. 119 Second, the director should regularly attend
board meetings, review all documents presented to the board, and otherwise
maintain a "general monitoring of corporate affairs and policies." 1" Third,
the director should review the company's financial statements regularly and
inquire into any questionable or adverse conditions that are revealed by those
statements.'21 Lastly, the director should make a reasonable inquiry into any
improper or irregular corporate activities that come to her attention.'2 The
court went on to point out that the negligence of a director, here Mrs.
Prichard, does not result in liability unless it is a proximate cause of the
loss."2 In other words, if the officer/director had observed his or her duty of
care, the loss would not have occurred.'24 The importance of the proximate
cause requirement in a director's duty of care is that it correlates to the
"responsible relation" requirement of the responsible corporate officer
doctrine.'2 In other words, a director or officer need not fear any litigation
against himself either civil or criminal, unless he/she was the one who could
have prevented the violation of the law. 1 6  These proximate
cause/responsible relation requirements should relieve directors and officers
and prevent a mass hysteria (or mass resignation) should the RCO doctrine
be implemented in a wider range ofareas. In the case of Mrs. Pritchard, the
court had no trouble determining that Mrs. Pritchard's neglect of her duties
had proximately caused the loss to the firm."
B. State Cases Analyzing the RCO Doctrine and Fiduciary Duties
In particular, two state supreme court cases have emphasized the close
correlation between the responsible corporate officer doctrine and the
corporate officers fiduciary duties. The first State v. Kailua Auto Wreckers,
t19 See id. at 821.
1D See id. at 822.
121 See id. at 823.
122 See id.
123 See id. at 826.
124 Seeid.
12 See supra notes 42 to 43 and accompanying text.
126 This paper does not try to distinguish between the corporate responsibilities of outside
directors and inside directors. Generally outside directors do not incur the same oversight responsibilities
that corporate insiders do.
IV2 Francis, 432 A.2d at 829.
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Inc., 12 involved a closely held corporation between a husband and wife. The
wife was president-treasurer in name only,"2 and characterized herself as a
housewife. 3 The husband was the vice-president, general manager,
secretary and director. 3 ' The husband was also in charge of the day to day
running of the business. The husband burned automobiles to sell for scrap
in violation of Hawaii's State Public Health Regulation.1 2 The corporation
was cited with seventeen violations of the Public Health Regulations, and the
husband and wife were each cited individually for the violations. 33  The
corporation, the husband, and the wife were held liable at the trial level.
"The evidence at trial overwhelmingly established that KAW violated PHR
Ch. 43, Sec. 7 on seventeen different occasions in 197 6 .""1 The trial court
noted that a corporation is merely an artificial entity and can only act through
the individuals who act on its behalf' 31 In 1976, KAW had only two agents,
the husband and wife. Therefore, the trial court deduced that the husband
and/or wife had authorized or committed the offense themselves. 3 6 On
appeal, the husband and wife claimed that they could not be held personally
liable because the trial court failed to establish their participation in the
unlawful acts. The appellate court had no problem in holding the husband
liable as he had admitted in court that he engaged in the burnings. The wife,
however, was a different matter. Even though she held a high corporate
position, she did not take an active part in the business and never set
company policy.137 Because there was no direct proof that Mrs. Weber either
performed or authorized the performance ofKAW's illegal open burning, she
could not be held personally liable under Hawaii Penal Code S 702.228(1).131
However, the court did find liability under the RCO doctrine'39 after first
'2 615 P.2d 730 (Haw. 1980).
19 See id. at 733.
1 See id. at 737.
01 See id. at 733.
132 See id. The defendant admitted at trial to committing these violations. See id.
133 See id.
13 Id. at 736.
1 See id.
136 See id.
t" See id. at 737.
M See id. at 736. Section 702.228 provides:
Liability of persons acting, or under a duty to act, in behalf of corporations or unincorporated
associations ....
(1) A person is legally accountable for any conduct he performs or causes to be
performed in the name of a corporation... to the same extent as if it were
performed in his own name or behalf
HAw. REv. STAT. S 702.228 (1972).
139 See Kailua Auto Wreckers, 615 P.2d at 737.
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stating that it is "critical in our determination ... that the instant case involve
corporate violations of a police regulation intended to protect the public from
the harmful effects of air pollution.""4 The court went on to review Park,
determining that "the court considered two primary factors in setting for the
standard for determining the personal liability of responsible corporate
officers for corporate violations of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act;
the first factor was the nature of the statute involved; the second, the harm
sought to be prevented."' 4 The court held that:
[I]n accordance with the principles set forth in Park ...high
corporate officers who possess managerial authority bear a personal
responsibility to the public to exercise reasonable care to discover any
violation of the open burning regulation, to remedy any such violation
of which the officer knows or should have known, and to prevent future
violations.' 42
This holding imposes a negligence standard on the responsible corporate
officer. The court noted:
Courts may consider numerous factors in determining whether a
corporate officer has been negligent and, therefore, should be held
liable for a corporate violation. Relevant factors include, but are not
limited to, the degree of harm to the public, the egregiousness of the
violations, the supervisory authority and control vested in a
particular corporate position, and the size of the corporation. 43
This case shows quite clearly the correlation between the Responsible
Corporate Officer Doctrine and a corporate officers duty of care. The
housewife in this case, Mrs. Weber, claimed that she could not be convicted
of the charges because she was a "mere housewife".'" The court, in a
footnote, stated that:
Corporate officers are not free from personal liability where they
serve in those capacities only as an "accommodation" and do not
participate actively in the corporation's affairs. A person cannot
divorce the responsibilities ofa corporate position from the statutory
140 Id. at 738.
141 Id. at 738-39.
142 Id. at 740. (emphasis added).
143 Id.
144 See id. at 738.
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and common law duties it carries with it by accepting the position
merely as an accommodation.
141
Isn't the director's factual situation in this case substantially similar to
that of Mrs. Pritchard in Francis v. United Jersey?4 6  They were both
"housewives" who were placed in the position of being directors of
corporations that neither one participated in. Neither one went to board
meetings, neither one took interest in the day-to-day operations of the
corporation. What is the difference? KAW was convicted of seventeen
counts of openly burning automobiles on seventeen different occasions in
violation of State Public Health Regulations, a criminal offense. Pritchard
& Baird went bankrupt. In both cases, the housewife was held personally
liable because they held corporate officer positions and had a responsible
relation to the violation.
BEC Corp.(Rule 10.2.1(c)) v. The Department ofEnvironmental Protection,47
involved a closely owned corporation that operated an oil storage facility.
Irvin Shiner was President' and his son Michael Shiner was Vice-
President/Secretary of the corporation.' 49 Both were held individually liable
for the corporation's violations of Connecticut's Clean Water Act." The
court discussed how personal liability for environmental violations is
recognized under federal law.' The court also recognized that the RCO
doctrine would apply if three elements were met:
1) the individual must be in a position of responsibility which allows
the person to influence corporate policy or activity, 2) the existence
of a nexus between the individual's position and the violation in
question such that the individual could have influenced the
corporate actions which constitute the violations; and 3) the
individual's actions or inactions facilitated the violations.
5 2
The court also recognized that these cases do not involve or require a
piercing ofthe corporate veil. The court distinguished piercing the corporate
145 Id. at 738 n.10.
146 See supra notes 113 to 127 and accompanying text.
147 BEC Corp. v. Dep't of Envd. Protection, No. CV 98-0492627S, 1999 WL 300649 (Conn.
Super. Ct. May 3,1999).
148 See id. at *3.
'4 See id. at *4.
,s0 See id. at *8.
131 See id.
1s2 Id. at *9 (quoting In re Matter of Dougherty, 482 N.W.2d. 485 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)).
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veil, where the owner does not fully honor the corporate structure of the
entity, from personal liability for environmental law violations premised on
the personal involvement ofthe decision makers.5 3 The court found that the
President, Irvin Shiner, stood in a responsible relation, not because he was
President, but rather because "his complete control of the day to day
operations of the site, his presence at the site five days a week since 1970, and
his knowledge of the operations of the facility are connected to the history
of repeated oil leaks and failure of soil remediation" which violated the
statute1 4 The court also found Michael Shiner stood in a responsible
relation because he was responsible for environmental compliance, and his
inactions facilitated the violations. 55
V. EXTENDING RCO DOCTRINE TO OTHER CLASSES OF CASES
Beaulieu v. RSJ, Inc. 116 involved a charge of sex discrimination against a
corporation and its corporate officer.'5 7 The facts of this case revealed that
Joseph Schaefer and his wife were seventy percent shareholders of RSJ,
which operated a restaurant known as Jose's American Bar and Grill.""
Joseph Schaefer made decisions concerningthe operation of the restaurant.5 9
In 1989, he instituted a uniform change requiring the waitress' to wear
revealing uniforms.'" Several waitresses were allegedly fired for refusing to
wear the new uniforms and six employees filed charges with the Minnesota
Department of Human Rights (MDHR) .161 An administrative law judge
determined that Schaefer was liable under the Responsible Corporate Officer
doctrine. 62 On appeal, the appellate court overturned, stating that the
responsible corporate officer doctrine did not apply because the Minnesota
Human Rights Act did not impose strict liability.' 63 Instead, liability "only
's3 See id. at *8.
154 Id. at *9.
'ss See id.
's' 532 N.W.2d 610 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) rev'd 552 N.W.2d 695 (Minn. 1996).
157 RSJ, Inc., 552 N.W.2d. at 696. The facts of this case are more fully set out in the Minnesota
Supreme Court decision, therefore, I will use that decision for the facts even though the Minnesota
Supreme Court refused to decide the issue of whether the RCO doctrine would apply in this case. See
id. at 700 n.4.
158 See id. at 698.
139 See id.
160 See id. The new uniforms consisted of a white tank top and tight fitting orange running shorts
similar to those worn by waitresses in the "Hooter's" restaurant chain. See id.
161 See id.
162 See State v. RSJ, Inc., 532 N.W.2d 610,612 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
16 Id. at 614.
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[attached] if the employer knows or should know of the existence of the
harassment and fails to take timely and appropriate action." 1' Note that the
standard of knowledge applied in this case was the same that was applied in
State v. KAWAuto Wreckers.' 6 The Supreme Court of Minnesota, on appeal
by the Department of Human Rights, affirmed the court of appeals but only
to the extent that the claim was time-barred.'" In dismissing the action as
time-barred, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not touch the issue of
whether the administrative lawjudge was correct to apply the RCO doctrine
cases which involved a Human Rights violation, or whether the Court of
Appeals was correct in that the "knowing" requirement prevented application
of the RCO doctrine. 167
If such a case were to come back before the Minnesota Supreme Court,
there are many reasons why the responsible corporate officer doctrine should
apply. The facts of this case reveal that after MDHR made its probable cause
findings, Jose's and MDHR engaged in conciliation unsuccessfully. Less
than six months after Jose's received notice of the probable cause findings,
Jose's assets were sold. Six months after that, the MDHR filed a complaint
against Jose's and Schaefer. Again, six months later, Schaefer filed for
Chapter 11 bankruptcy."'" It's evident that Schaefer was intentionally trying
to evade any liability for implementing a policy that exposed the corporation
to liability. He first sold the assets of the company after the MDHR made a
probable cause determination that the company was guilty of discrimination.
He then filed bankruptcy himselfafter he was personally charged with aiding
and abetting the discrimination. 69 Secondly, the factors that determine
application of the RCO doctrine in Minnesota set out in BEG, Corp. would
fit this case.'17 Although the Minnesota Human Rights Statute is not an
environmental statute, there are strong public policy reasons for holding
corporate officers liable whose actions cause the corporation to violate a
person's human rights. Schaefer's actions fit the "nexus" required by RCO
16 Id. (emphasis added).
165 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
16 See RSJ, Inc., 552 N.W.2d at 700.
67 See id. at 700 n.4.
16 See id. at 699.
169 See RS, Inc., 532 N.W.2d at 611. The court of appeals took a different view of these facts,
justifying its enforcement of the statute of limitations by stating:
Realtors did not learn of the charges against them until more than three years after the alleged
events occurred. RSJ had sold its assets and gone out of business before the complaint was filed.
By the time the hearing took place, Schaefer had filed for bankruptcy. More than five years
separated the hearing from the complained of events.
Id. at 612-13 (emphasis added).
170 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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doctrine in that he had control over the day to day running of the company,
he was the one who implemented the new uniform policy, and he was the
one who fired the waitresses who refused to wear the new uniform.17' "The
uniforms for managerial employees and the other line employees did not
change at this time." 72
Additonally, even if the statute does not impose strict liability for
violations, the statute itself states that liability attaches if the employer knows
or should know of the existence of the harassment. 173 This is the same
standard of care that was used in Overland Cotton Mill,174 Burnham, 175 and
Kailua Auto Wreckers76 to impose liability on a responsible corporate officer
whose actions or inactions resulted in a corporation's liability.
VI. CONCLUSION
The scienter requirement in a statute should not really bar the expansion
of the RCO doctrine. As we have seen, knowledge can be imputed to
someone by circumstantial evidence, and by willful blindness. Moreover, as
Crock points out in his article, many times corporate higher-ups actually do
know what is going on.1" Since knowledge can be satisfied in a statute with
a scienter requirement (colloquial) is there any reason why knowledge
should not be imputed to someone who had a duty to know? The safeguard
against unlimited liability to the RCO doctrine is the requirement of
proximate causation. If the breach of the duty of care did not cause the
violation by the corporation, then the responsible corporate officer should
not be criminally liable. On the other hand, where the breach of the duty of
care proximately causes the violation the corporation is charged with, the
responsible corporate officer should share the criminal liability.
As for Ford and Firestone, only time will tell, but the recent fiasco has
many people reminiscing about the Pinto disaster. In that case the federal
government did not bring criminal charges against Ford executives and when
a local prosecutor tried, the executives were acquitted.178  The most
promising route seems to be yet another civil suit if it can be shown that
Ford knew it had a defective product and failed to notify NHTSA under
1 See RSJ, Inc., 552 N.W.2d at 698.
172 Id.
13 See MINN. STAT. S 363.01 (1991) (emphasis added).
174 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
175 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
176 See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
177 See Crock, supra note 13.
17 See NPR: All Things Considered, supra note 4.
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federal regulations that require notification within five days of discovering
a defective product in the United States. 79 A civil suit, like the Pinto case,
may not be enough to prevent a reoccurrence in corporate crime, however,
and more lives may be lost. Additionally, measures like those recently
introduced by Senators Leahy and Specter are only band-aids applied to a
particular problem. The courts need to take the lead and show the corporate
world that corporate crime will not be tolerated. As Harvard Business
School Professor, John B. Matthews noted "[t]he best way to get
management's attention is to punish management directly.""*
"' See id.
I8 Crock, supra note 13.
